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TORT LAW-New Mexico Limits Recovery of Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress to Sudden, Traumatic
Accidents-Fernandez v. Waigreen Hastings Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co.,' the New Mexico Supreme Court
established new limits on the ability of bystanders who witness injuries to their
relatives to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
The court held that bystanders are permitted to recover for emotional distress
damages only when the injury was caused by a sudden, traumatic event and the
plaintiff was aware that the event was causing injury to the victim.2 In adopting both
a sudden occurrence test and a meaningful observation test, the court limited the
application of NIED to the traditional types of accidents in which the court first
recognized the cause of action. This Note describes the historical context of NIED,
examines the Fernandez court's rationale, and explores the implications of the
Fernandez decision for future New Mexico NIED cases.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Eufelia Manuelita Fernandez sued Walgreen Hastings Company
(Walgreens) and two of its employees after the death of her 22-month-old
granddaughter, Margarita Danielle Valdez.3 On January 3, 1994, Margarita was
diagnosed with viral croup. Plaintiff went to Walgreen's pharmacy to fill an order
for Pediapred, a steroid prescribed to keep Margarita's airway from swelling. The
pharmacy mistakenly provided Pediaprofen, a pain reliever with only mild anti-
inflammatory properties. Plaintiff, unaware of the pharmacy's mistake, administered
several doses of the ineffective medicine to her granddaughter. The next day, after
Margarita's condition noticeably worsened, the family drove her to the hospital.
Still in the car, Margarita began to suffocate due to the blockage in her throat.
Eufelia was holding her granddaughter while she turned blue and then fell into a
coma. The girl died two days later.
Plaintiff sued for NIED and loss of consortium. Walgreens filed a motion to
dismiss both counts for failure to state a claim. Because Plaintiff filed an affidavit
with her response brief, the trial court heard the matter as a motion for summary
judgment, and granted judgment in favor of Walgreens on both counts.' Plaintiff
appealed to the court of appeals, which certified the case to the supreme court. The
supreme court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the claim for NIED, but
reversed on the claim for loss of consortium.5 In affirming the trial court on the
1. 126 N.M. 263,968 P.2d 774 (1998).
2. See id. at 268,968 P.2d at 779.
3. Unless otherwise cited, all factual and procedural information is from Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 265-66,
968 P.2d at 776-77.
4. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim brought under N.M. R. Cjv. P. 1-012(b)(6) is treated as
a motion for summary judgment brought under N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-056 when matters outside the pleadings are
presented to the trial court. See Graff v. Glennon, 106 N.M. 668, 668, 748 P.2d 511, 511 (1988).
5. This Note only examines the loss of consortium issue as it relates to the NIED claim. The Fernandez
decision was novel, however, in that it extended the loss of consortium cause of action to include grandparents. See
Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 271-73,968 P.2d at 782-84.
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NIED claim, the supreme court held that NIED does not compensate for the
observation of a family member's suffering where the plaintiff was not a bystander
to a sudden, traumatic injury-producing event and was also not aware of the cause
of the victim's injuries.6
MIl. BACKGROUND
Emotional injuries have never been afforded equal treatment with physical
injuries. At early common law, damages for "shock" or "fright" were not available
except in cases of intentional assault.7 Gradual recognition of the validity of
emotional injuries, however, has led courts to loosen restrictions on emotional
distress recoveries. Courts first recognized that plaintiffs who suffered physical
injuries should be allowed to recover for the pain and suffering associated with
those injuries.8 The next expansion was the "zone of danger" rule, which allowed
recovery for those who were threatened with, but did not actually suffer, physical
injuries.9 In many of these zone of danger cases, the plaintiffs who escaped without
physical injuries often watched while others were not as lucky.'0 Often, those
plaintiffs who were in the zone of danger were allowed to recover for the emotional
distress damages that resulted from watching the injuries inflicted on third parties
as well as the emotional distress from their fear for their own safety." Those outside
the zone of danger, however, had no cause of action as a result of witnessing the
same event.12 Courts reasoned that injury to a bystander who was outside the zone
of danger was not foreseeable; therefore, the tortfeasor owed no duty to the
bystander. 13
A. The Bystander Cause of Action
In 1968, in Dillon v. Legg," the California Supreme Court further expanded
recovery for emotional injuries by recognizing a cause of action for bystanders who
suffered emotional distress as a result of merely witnessing an accident that causes
6. See id at 268, 968 P.2d at 782.
7. At least one scholar, however, has noted that even early case law did not support the generalization in
some cases that "[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful
act complained of causes that alone." See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 HARv. L REV. 1033, 1033 (1936) (quoting Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861)).
8. See, e.g., Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L Ry. Co. v. Story, 63 111. App. 239 (1896) (holding that in an action
to recover damages for personal injuries, mental as well as bodily suffering resulting from the injury may be
considered in estimating the damages, but mental suffering alone and unconnected with the bodily injury cannot
be considered).
9. See, e.g.,Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., I K.B. 141 (C.A. 1925) (allowing wrongfuldeath recovery against
the owner of a runaway lorry which nearly struck a pregnant woman, causing her extreme fright and resulting in
a miscarriage and subsequent death from shock). The Hambrook court noted "[t]he cause of action... appears to
be created by breach of the ordinary care of duty to take reasonable care to avoid inflicting personal injuries,
followed by damage, even though the type of damage may be unexpected-namely, shock." Id. at 156.
10. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419,420 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (involving a mother who was
standing on a sidewalk when her child was struck by automobile).
11. See, e.g., Bowman v. Williams, 165 A. 182 (Md. 1933) (finding that plaintiffhas right to recovery even
when his injuries arose from fear for the safety of his children rather than for his own).
12. See Tobin, 249 N.E.2d at 434.
13. See id
14. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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serious injury to a loved one, despite being outside the zone of danger. 5 In Dillon,
the plaintiff was a mother who was standing on a sidewalk watching her two
daughters cross the street when one was suddenly struck and killed by a car. 6 Both
she and her surviving daughter brought a claim for emotional distress damages
against the negligent driver. 7 The trial court applied the zone of danger test, which
had been affirmed in California just five years earlier, 8 allowing the sister to
recover but rejecting the mother's claim, even though the two were standing only
a few feet apart. 9 Calling this result "incongruous and somewhat revolting,"'2 the
Dillon court rejected the zone of danger test and held that courts should apply
general negligence principles in determining whether the defendant owed a duty to
the plaintiff.2
The Dillon court bolstered its decision with classic statements establishing
foreseeability as the primary factor in determining duty,' but its decision did not
elevate emotional injuries to a status equal to that of physical injuries. Although the
court noted that "general principles of tort law are acknowledged to work
successfully in all other cases of emotional trauma,"' the court also articulated the
following specific factors that should be used to determine whether the emotional
injury to bystander was foreseeable:
1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted
with one who was a distance away from it;
2) Whether the shock resulted from direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from
the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence; and
3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an
absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.'
The court also limited its holding to plaintiffs whose emotional trauma is so severe
it manifests in a physical illness as well.' In expanding recovery for emotional
distress injuries the court rejected arguments that NIED recovery would lead to a
flood of litigation and force courts to sift through countless fraudulent claims. The
15. See id. at915, 920.
16. See id at 914.
17. See id.
18. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963). California had rejected the
physical impact rule several decades earlier in Cook v. Maier, 92 P.2d 434,435 (Cal. 1939).
19. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915.
20. Id. at919n.4.
21. See id. at 920.
22. See id. at 919 (quoting Judge Cardozo's declaration in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,
100 (N.Y. 1928), that "[tihe risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed"). The Dillon court also
cited Profs. Harper and James: "Duty... is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably
entails." Id. at 920 (citing 2 FULLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS 1018 (1956)). Prof. Prosser,
meanwhile, was cited for the proposition that the injury to Mrs. Dillon, and others like her, was foreseeable. "When
a child is endangered, it is not beyond contemplation that its mother will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will
suffer serious shock." 14d at 914 (citing WJujAM L PROSSER, LAw OF TORTs 353 (3d ed. 1961)).
23. Id. at 925.
24. Id. at 920.
25. See id. at 917. The court noted that Mrs. Dillon alleged in her complaint that she "'sustained great
emotional disturbance and shock and injury to her nervous system' which caused her great physical and mental
pain and suffering." Id. at 914.
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court asserted that such prophesies should not stop the court from compensating
legitimate injuries26 and noted that such predictions had accompanied prior
expansions of tort law and yet had rarely come to pass.27 Still, the Dillon court
acknowledged the factors it identified in its opinion would be insufficient to guide
future courts as new cases emerged. Indeed, the court predicted that "[in future
cases the courts will draw lines of demarcation upon facts more subtle than the
compelling ones alleged in the complaint before us."2
Despite those words, the justices on the Dillon court might not have predicted
either the profound impact the case would have or the level of dissension that would
arise over how to draw the "lines of demarcation." Thirty-two years after Dillon, the
majority of states have adopted the California position in one form or another. Only
a handful of states have rejected the bystander cause of action altogether.29 A
minority have either maintained the direct impact requirement, a° or the zone of
danger requirement. a'
Courts that have allowed bystander recovery have been divided on what standard
to apply to these cases. A few have used the factors articulated in Dillon as general
guidelines for determining when a bystander's emotional injury is foreseeable.32
Some have adopted a more liberal approach, using only the general principles of
negligence to determine whether a plaintiff should recover damages.33 In these
states, it is generally up to the fact-finder to determine whether the tortfeasor had
a duty to the bystander plaintiff.' A far greater number of jurisdictions have used
the Dillon factors, or variants thereof, as bright-line tests, thereby creating an issue
that can be addressed by the court on a motion to dismiss or for summary
26. The Dillon court asserted that "[tihe possibility that fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in
isolated cases does not justify a wholesale rejection of the entire class of claims in which that potentiality arises."
Id. at 917-18.
27. See id. at 921-22. in particular, the court noted that it had rejected such arguments in loosening
standards for privity of contract in products liability cases, in granting recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and in "open car" cases in which courts have held car owners liable for injuries that result after
the theft of unsecured vehicles. See id.
28. Id. at 921.
29. See, e.g., Mechanics Lumber Co. v. Smith, 752 S.W.2d 763,765 (Ark. 1988) (noting that "a claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress is not recognized in Arkansas"); Gideon v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 633
So. 2d 453,453 (Ala. 1994) (rejecting all forms of bystander recovery); OB-GYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton,
386 S.E.2d 146, 149 (Ga. 1989) (holding that Georgia does not recognize the "fear for another" rule which permits
recovery of damages for emotional distress by one who witnesses injury to another).
30. See, e.g., Groves v. Taylor, 711 N.E.2d 861,863 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Wilhoite v. Cobb, 761 S.W.2d
625, 626 (Ky. 1988); Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., 916 P.2d 241, 246 (Okla. 1996); Saechao v.
Matsakoun, 717 P.2d 165, 169 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). Idaho recognizes a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress but has no case law recognizing recovery for accident bystanders. See, e.g., Brooks v. Logan,
944 P.2d 709, 709 (Idaho 1997).
31. See, e.g., Pierce v. Casas Adobes Baptist Church, 782 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ariz. 1989); Colwell v.
Mentzner nvs., 973 P.2d 631, 638 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1063 (D.C. 1990);
Maness v. Santa Fe Park Enters., 700 N.E.2d 194, 200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); lacona v. Schrupp, 521 N.W.2d 70.
72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Mem'l Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Mo. 1990); Kurth v.
Murphy, 679 N.Y.S.2d 690,690 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Whetham v. Bismark Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678,684 (N.D.
1972); Nielson v. AT&T, 597 N.W.2d 434, 440 (S.D. 1999); Leo v. Hillman, 665 A.2d 572, 576 (Vt. 1995).
32. See, e.g., Wrenn v. Byrd, 464 S.E.2d 89,91 (N.C. App. 1995); Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789,791-92
(Alaska 1987).
33. See, e.g., Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 576 (Haw. 1989); Ramsey v. Beavers, 931
S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tenn. 1996).
34. See, e.g., Masaki, 780 P.2d at 576.
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judgment.35 To a plaintiff, the position a state court takes determines whether it will
be a jury that determines whether his or her injury merits recovery, or whether he
or she must meet specific criteria to get past a judicial gatekeeping function.36
The key dilemma in these cases is how to balance the need to compensate
foreseeable injuries against the need to place reasonable limits on recovery. Those
jurisdictions that impose strict bright-line rules have expressed concern that
foreseeability casts too wide a net when it comes to emotional injuries and have
insisted that recovery must be limited in order to maintain certainty in the law and
avoid imposing liability out of proportion to a defendant's negligent conduct.37
Those advocating a more flexible approach, on the other hand, conclude that
stringent restrictions lead to arbitrary results, excluding plaintiffs who suffer
genuine, foreseeable emotional injuries. "[Clonfusion and inconsistency are the
result of a strict construction of the Dillon guidelines. The courts have woven a web
of arbitrary rules having little or no relation to the reasonable foreseeability of a
plaintiff's emotional distress."
38
B. New Mexico Adopts a Modified Dillon Approach
New Mexico first recognized a bystander cause of action in the 1983 case,
Ramirez v. Armstrong.39 New Mexico's approach differed from Dillon in two
significant ways. First, the New Mexico court established firm criteria limiting the
new cause of action, rather than merely articulating general guidelines. 4' Second,
New Mexico's criteria were more detailed than those in Dillon. When Ramirez was
decided, New Mexico's criteria, especially that dealing with the relationship
between the plaintiff and the victim, were the most specific of any jurisdiction at
that point.4' New Mexico announced four limitations on bystander recovery:
1) There must be a marital or intimate family relationship between the victim
and the plaintiff, limited to relationships between husband and wife, parent and
child, grandparent and grandchild, brother and sister, and to those persons who
occupy a legitimate position in loco parentis;
2) The shock to the plaintiff must be severe and result from a direct emotional
impact upon the plaintiff caused by the contemporaneous sensory perception of
the accident as contrasted with learning of the accident by means other than
35. See, e.g., Fineran v. Pickett, 465 N.W.2d 662,663 (Iowa 1991); Maguire v. State, 835 P.2d 755,761
(Mont. 1992); Declouet v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 715 So. 2d69, 79 (La. 1998); Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d
1047, 1050 (R.I. 1994). Some of the jurisdictional variations on the Dillon factors will be further discussed infra
part V.
36. See, e.g., Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59,61,792 P.2d 36,38 (1990) (holding that in New Mexico
duty is a question of law to be decided by the courts, while foreseability of injury is a question of fact to be
decided by a jury). But see, e.g., Mobaldi v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of California, 127 Cal.Rptr. 720,725 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the court, not the jury, is to determine whether the plaintiff's injury was foreseeable
in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases).
37. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814,828 (Cal. 1989) (recognizing that "drawing arbitrary lines
is unavoidable if we are to limit liability and establish meaningful rules for application by litigants and lower
courts").
38. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 20 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J. concurring and dissenting).
39. 100 N.M. 538, 543,673 P.2d 822, 827 (1983).
40. See id. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825.
41. See Howard H. Kestin, The Bystander's Cause of Action for Emotional Injury: Reflections on the
Relational Eligibility Standard, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 512, 525 (1996).
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contemporaneous sensory perception, or by learning of the accident after its
occurrence;
3) There must be some physical manifestation of, or physical injury to, the
plaintiff, resulting from the emotional injury;
4) The accident must result in physical injury or death to the victim.42
Despite these differences, the Ramirez court echoed the reasoning of Dillon.
First, it reiterated the importance of foreseeability. "If it is found that a plaintiff, and
injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the
defendant." '43 The Ramirez court also emphasized the importance of the interest in
emotional security," adding, "[tihe tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress
is a tort against the integrity of the family unit."' 5 Finally, the court rejected the
notion that recognition of a bystander cause of action would lead to a flood of new
litigation because "this type of action has not proven to be unmanageable to the
California courts."
Seven years later, in Folz v. State,"' the court abandoned the requirement that the
plaintiff suffer a physical injury as a result of his or her emotional distress,
explaining that "[pihysical manifestation should not be the sine qua non by which
to establish damages resulting from emotional trauma." In its decision, the Folz
court relied heavily on an Ohio case that had abandoned the Dillon factors for the
more flexible general negligence standards in bystander cases."9 The Folz court,
however, maintained the other three factors as threshold requirements.5"
The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the scope of the contemporaneous
sensory perception element in Acosta v. Castle Construction, Inc.,5' holding that a
plaintiff who heard but did not see an accident could recover NIED damages.52 That
case involved a construction foreman whose brother was electrocuted on the
construction site. The plaintiff heard screaming, and ran to find a coworker
performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation on his brother, who had also been
working at the site.53 The plaintiff observed smoke coming from his brother's nose
and mouth.' The court of appeals, holding that the experience of hearing the
accident was sufficient to meet the sensory perception element, reversed the trial
court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.55
42. Ramirez. 100 N.M. at 541-42,673 P.2d at 825-26.
43. Id. at 541,673 P.2d at 825.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 542,673 P.2d at 826.
47. 110 N.M. 457, 797 P.2d 246 (1990).
48. Id. at 470, 797 P.2d at 259.
49. See id. (discussing Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766 (Ohio 1983)). Ohio later adopted more
stringent elements. See Burris v. Grange Mut. Co., 545 N.E.2d 83, 90-91 (Ohio 1989).
50. See Foiz, 110 N.M. at 471,797 P.2d at 260. In eliminating the physical manifestation requirement, New
Mexico was once again following the path tread by California, which had taken the same step a decade earlier. See
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813,821 (Cal. 1980) (holding thatissueof whether plaintiff has suffered
serious and compensable emotional distress is matter of proof to be presented to trier of fact).
51. 117 N.M. 28, 868 P.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1994).
52. See id. at 30, 868 P.2d at 675.
53. See id. at 29, 868 P.2d at 674.
54. See id
55. See id. at 30, 868 P.2d at 675.
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Acosta, like Folz, can be viewed as expansion of the NIED tort to a class of
plaintiffs that had previously been excluded. The Acosta court, however, noted that
the Ramirez test chose language broad enough to encompass a plaintiff who did not
see the injury-causing accident, explaining "[i]f the Court wanted to require
presence and sight as elements, it could have easily done so, but it did not. Instead,
the Court chose a phrase that has a broader meaning .... "" The New Mexico
Supreme Court reiterated this point in its next bystander case, stating that Acosta
"did not expand the concept of contemporaneous sensory perception, but rather
properly applied it to the facts presented ...
During this time, the supreme court expanded the availability of compensation
for emotional injuries besides NIED. In 1994, the court recognized a cause of action
for loss of consortium, defined at that time as "the emotional distress suffered by
one spouse who loses the normal company of his or her mate when the mate is
physically injured due to the tortious conduct of another.""8 In the same year, in
another line of cases separate from the tort cases dealing with negligent infliction
of emotional distress, the court allowed plaintiffs to recover emotional distress
damages arising out of a breach of contract action.59
Nonetheless, in its next bystander case, Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi Property
Management, Inc.,6° the supreme court reversed the trend toward expansion of the
NIED tort. In Gabaldon, the court affirmed summary judgment against a plaintiff
whose son had nearly drowned while playing at a water park.6' The plaintiff was not
present at the park when the accident occurred, but she came to the scene after
receiving a phone call from a park employee.62 The court found that the plaintiff had
not met the contemporaneous sensory perception requirement and denied recovery
for NIED.'3 The court declined to impose a rule requiring a plaintiff to be present
at the scene of an accident," electing instead to adopt the "ambulance rule," which
allowed recovery for a plaintiff who was not present at an accident but came upon
the scene shortly thereafter so long as he or she was present before emergency
medical professional arrived at the scene.65
56. See id.
57. See Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi Property Management, Inc., 122 N.M. 393, 394,925 P.2d 510,511 (1996).
58. Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M. 422,425,872 P.2d 840, 843 (1994). Fernandez expanded the definition
of consortium to include the grandparent-grandchild relationship. See Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 271-273, 968 P.2d
at 782-84.
59. See Flores v. Baca, 117 N.M. 306, 871 P.2d 962 (1994) (relatives of improperly embalmed decedent
allowed to recover for emotional distress from witnessing or learning about decayed body). The Flores holding was
affirmed in Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne Mortuary, 124 N.M. 613, 954 P.2d 45 (1998).
60. 122 N.M. 393, 925 P.2d 510 (1996).
61. See id. at 393, 925 P.2d at 510.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 397, 925 P.2d at 514. Many jurisdictions have imposed such a rule. See infra, note 124.
65. See Gabaldon, 122 N.M. at 397,925 P.2d at 514 (explaining that"[tihe shock of seeing efforts to save
the life of an injured spouse in an ambulance or hospital ... will not be compensated because it is a life experience
that all may expect to endure") (internal citation omitted). The court did not focus on the intervening phone call,
which could have been the basis for denial of recovery under Dillon because the plaintiff learned of the accident
from another party, rather than witnessing it herself. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920; see also Mazzagatti v.
Everinghiam, 516 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa. 1986) (holding that a defendant owes no duty of care to relative who comes
to the scene after learning of the accident from another party). Some jurisdictions have considered but rejected a
rule denying recovery to witnesses who were at the scene of an accident "voluntarily," either after learning of the
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Gabaldon could be viewed as an expansion of NIED, as the court had never
previously indicated that a plaintiff who arrived after an accident could recover
under an NIED theory. The Gabaldon court was unambiguous, however, in its
intention to impose bright-line limits on recovery and to prevent future expansion
of the tort.' The Gabaldon court noted that even California had recognized that the
flexible approach adopted in Dillon "had proven to be unworkable."67 The court
thus emphasized that the elements of NIED were "mandatory preconditions" rather
than flexible guidelines." Furthermore, the court stated that it would not rely on
foreseeability alone in determining who could recover for damages under this tort,
but instead would impose limitations in order to limit the liability imposed on a
defendant.69
It is apparent that reliance on foreseeability of injury alone in finding a duty, and
thus a right to recover, is not adequate when the damages sought are for an
intangible injury. In order to avoid limitless liability out of all proportion to the
degree of a defendant's negligence, and against which it is impossible to insure
without imposing unacceptable costs on those among whom the risk is spread,
the right to recover for negligently caused emotional distress must be limited.70
The determination as to who recovers, the court explained, is a policy decision
imposed by the courts.7' Making a distinction that would prove important in
Fernandez, the Gabaldon court explained that the purpose of NIED is to
compensate a specific type of emotional distress--the mental anguish that results
from witnessing either the accident that causes injury to a loved one or from seeing
the immediate aftermath. In contrast, the court stated that bystander NIED is not
intended to compensate "the grief and despair to loved ones that invariably attend
nearly every accidental death or serious injury."'72 The court explained:
[t]he compensable serious emotional distress of a bystander under the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress is not measured by the acute emotional
distress of the loss of the family member. Rather the damages arise from the
bystander's observance of the circumstances of the death or serious injury,
either when the injury occurs or soon after.
accident or who were aware of the risk of injury before the accident. See Turner v. Medical Ctr., 686 A.2d 830,833
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that plaintiff's NIED claim should not be denied on the basis of her voluntary
presence while sister delivered baby); Stump v. Ashland, 499 S.E.2d 41, 50 (W.Va. 1997) (holding that voluntary
presence at fire should not bar recovery because "it would be the natural reaction of a person to rush to the scene
in order to affect a rescue or aid the injured victim").
66. See Gabaldon, 122 N.M. at 396-97, 925 P.2d at 513-14.
67. See id at 395,925 P.2d at 512. In Thing, the California Supreme Court stated that the Dillon court was
overly optimistic in believing that recognition of NIED, without express limitations, would not lead to a flood of
litigation. To the contrary, the Thing court observed that "fin the ensuing twenty years, like the pebble cast into
the pond, Dillon's progeny have created ever widening circles of liability." 'Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d at 819
(Cal. 1989).
68. See Gabaldon, 122 N.M. at 397,925 P.2d at 514.
69. See id. at 395,925 P.2d at 511.
70. id. (quoting Thing, 771 P.2d at 826-27.)
71. See id at 396, 925 P.2d at 513 (noting that NIED is a judicially created cause of action, and therefore
the court has the ability to either expand or contract a plaintiff's ability to recover damages).
72. See id.
73. Id. at 397, 925 P.2d at 514.
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IV. RATIONALE
In each of the prior New Mexico cases, the plaintiffs sought recovery after an
accident that brought sudden harm to a relative. The New Mexico Supreme Court
found that Fernandez presented a different type of case.74 While Margarita lapsed
into a coma just one day after the pharmacy misfilled the prescription, the court
noted that hers was "a condition that progressively led to a more and more serious
condition over time," rather than an injury caused by a sudden, external occurrence
such as an automobile accident." The court therefore set out to determine whether
the course of events that led to Margarita's injury could be considered an
"accident," such that a witness to those events could meet the contemporaneous
sensory perception element of the NIED test.76
A. The Sudden Occurrence Test
Plaintiff argued that the word "accident" refers to the victim's injury.' The court
rejected this position, explaining that if the observation of the victim's injuries
alone were sufficient, a plaintiff could recover even if he or she was not a bystander
to the injury-producing event.78 The court noted that New Mexico's
contemporaneous sensory perception element requires a plaintiff seeking damages
for NIED to observe more than the victim's injuries. 79 "Although undoubtedly
horrific and tragic, witnessing a victim's suffering and death is not compensable
under NIED."'
The court reiterated the position taken in Gabaldon that the purpose of bystander
NIED is to compensate a plaintiffs emotional trauma from observing the actual
injury-producing event, not from merely observing the resulting injury to the his or
her loved one.8' The court explained that "[t]he former is an external occurrence
that immediately causes an injury, whereas the latter is an internal condition of the
victim." 2 The court adopted the sudden occurrence test as a means of
differentiating these two different emotional injuries, holding that a plaintiff must
"observe a sudden, traumatic, injury-producing event at the time of its occurrence
or soon after, but before the arrival of emergency medical professionals.""
Applying this test, the court found no sudden, traumatic event in the
circumstances leading up to Margarita's death, and therefore determined that
Plaintiff could not recover damages for bearing witness to her granddaughter's
suffering. Specifically, the court held that Margarita's lack of treatment "was not,
74. See Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 268,968 P.2d at 779.
75. See id. at 269, 968 P.2d at 780.
76. See id. at 266,968 P.2d at 777.
77. See id. at 267, 968 P.2d at 778.
78. See id.
79. See id
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 268, 968 P.2d at 779.
83. id. The classic example of a sudden, traumatic event is an automobile accident, the source of injury in
Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 539,673 P.2d 822, 823 (1983) and Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,460,797
P.2d 246, 256 (1990).
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and cannot possibly be, comprehended as a sudden, traumatic event.' ' 4 Instead, "her
going untreated was a condition that progressively led to a more and more serious
condition over time, and can hardly be called an event. 8 5 The inability to pinpoint
a specific, observable event was fatal to Mrs. Fernandez' case. "If we cannot point
to a moment in time at which the sudden, traumatic, injury-producing event
occurred, then we must assume that Plaintiff's shock and emotional distress resulted
instead from witnessing the suffering and death of the victim, which, although
tragic, is not compensable under NIED. '86 Thus, the court held that Plaintiff had not
stated a valid claim for NIED.
B. Meaningful Observation Test
In addition to the sudden occurrence test, the court adopted a meaningful
observation test, holding that the plaintiff must be aware at the time the injury-
producing event occurs that the event is causing injury to the victim.87 The court
explained that this requirement was also consistent with the position that the
plaintiff's emotional distress must result from witnessing the injury-producing
event, not from witnessing the injury. The court reasoned that if the plaintiff did not
understand at the time of the event that the defendant was causing injury to the
victim, then the plaintiff's suffering was a result of witnessing the injury alone.
"When the bystander contemporaneously perceives both the sudden injury-
producing and the injury and understands the causal relation between the former
and the latter, the bystander's resulting shock and severe emotional distress are
compensable." 88
The trial court had taken a more restrictive position, argued by the defendant, that
the plaintiff must observe the defendant's negligent conduct that causes the injury.89
The trial court had held that even though Plaintiff had personally picked up the
prescription, she did not witness the pharmacist's actual mistake in putting the
wrong medicine in the bottle. The supreme court explained that this definition also
84. Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 269,968 P.2d at 780.
85. Id
86. Id
87. See id at 268, 968 P.2d at 779.
88. Id
89. See id. at 267,968 P.2d at 778. Some jurisdictions impose a requirement that the plaintiff observe the
defendant's negligent conduct. See, e.g., Bloom v. Dubois Reg'I Med. Ctr., 597 A.2d 671,682 (Pa. 1991) (holding
that "[t]he gravamen of the observance requirement is clearly that the plaintiff in a negligent infliction case must
have observed the traumatic infliction of injury on his or her close relative at the hands of the defendant" (emphasis
added)). The dissent in that case argued that the test was inappropriate because it would allow recovery even when
the observation of negligent conduct played no role in the plaintiff's emotional trauma. See id. at 684 (Del Sole,
J. concurring and dissenting). One year later, in Love v. Cramer, 606 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1992), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court determined that a daughter who witnessed her mother suffer from a heart attack stated a claim for
NIED against her mother's treating physician because the daughter was also present during the examination in
which the doctor failed to properly diagnose the mother's condition. See id at 1178. In some jurisdictions, this
requirement has been imposed only in the context of NIED claims arising in medical malpractice cases. See, e.g.,
Gendek v. Poblete, 654 A.2d 970, 974 (N.J. 1995) (holding that plaintiff must witness actual malpractice, observe
effect of malpractice on patient, and immediately connect malpractice with injury); Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d
1142,1143 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that observation of injury must be contemporaneous with conduct causing injury
or death).
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did not fit with past cases which allowed bystander NED recovery.' For example,
the court pointed out that the plaintiff in Acosta, who witnessed his brother die from
shock after striking an electrically charged fence, was allowed to recover even
though he did not witness the act or omission that caused the excessive voltage in
the fence. 9' Rather, the plaintiff observed the event that caused injuries to his
brother.' Using an oft-cited example, the court noted that a bystander to an
automobile accident need not know the driver of an automobile was drunk to
recover emotional distress damages, so long as the bystander witnessed the
accident. 93
In rejecting Plaintiff's claim, the court noted that she did not know the cause of
her granddaughter's suffering until after her granddaughter's death. "What Plaintiff
observed was the progression of Margarita's injuries: the blockage of her airway,
her suffocation, and her death. She did not know their cause and witnessed no
causal event."9' Identifying the injury-producing event as the pharmacist's act of
providing the wrong medication, the court noted that Plaintiff did not know at that
time that this act would cause injury to her granddaughter.95 In addition, the court
noted that this event in itself would not cause Plaintiff emotional distress."
Alternatively, the court reasoned that even if Margarita's going untreated was the
injury-producing event, Plaintiff did not state a claim for NIED because she had not
alleged that she was aware Margarita was going untreated while the girl was
suffocating.9' "When the injury-producing event is either not observed or observed
but not understood as injury-producing, a claim for NIED will not lie."98
C. Public Policy
Perhaps more important than the specific tests adopted by the Fernandez court
was the clear statement that New Mexico would continue to limit bystander
recovery as a matter of public policy. Describing bystander recovery as a "vexing
problem," the court explained that it needed to "balance the competing goals of
providing reasonable compensation to bystanders who experience such suffering,
and restricting liability where the harm is too remote from the defendant's
conduct."99 The court emphasized that NIED recovery must be limited even when
the injury is foreseeable and the resulting emotional distress is severe.
It would certainly cause any parent great anguish to witness one's child in pain
and to be unable to alleviate it. However, the parents of every child injured
through the negligence of another are not entitled to recovery for their emotional
90. See Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 267, 968 P.2d at 778.
91. See Acosta, 117 N.M. 28, 30, 868 P.2d 673, 675.
92. See idt
93. See Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 267, 968 P.2d at 778.
94. Id. at 268, 968 P.2d at 779.
95. See id at 269, 968 P.2d at 780.
96. See id.
97. See id
98. Id.
99. Id at 270, 968 P.2d at 781.
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distress-no matter how foreseeable we may agree that such anguish wouldbe. ~o
The court stated that its new limitations on NIED recovery would achieve three
policy goals. First, these limitations provide more certainty in the law.' ' Second,
they limit the potential exposure of negligent actors."° Finally, these limitations
would serve to isolate the particular type of injury the court intended for the NIED
tort to compensate. 3 The court explained: "[w]e believe our approach reflects a
reasonable compromise between the competing goals of facilitating recovery for
negligently caused emotional distress and providing trial courts, insurers, and the
public with clearer guidelines for assessing exposure to liability."''
°4
V. ANALYSIS
A. Policy, Not Foreseeability, Determines Whether a Plaintiff Will Recover
for NIED
Fernandez represents a further retreat from the emphasis placed on foreseeability
in Ramirez and Dillon. As the court implicitly acknowledged, the defendants in this
case could have foreseen that an adult family member would be with Margarita
while the girl suffered the ill effects of the defendants' failure to provide the right
medication." Plaintiffs emotional injuries were no less foreseeable than the
physical injuries to Margarita, which were clearly compensable." 6
The two new limits imposed by the Fernandez court do not serve to isolate the
foreseeable from the unforeseeable. The California Supreme Court, for example,
specifically criticized the sudden occurrence test for eliminating claims based on
foreseeable injuries.
The "sudden occurrence" requirement is an unwarranted restriction on the
Dillon guidelines. Such a restriction arbitrarily limits liability when there is a
high degree of foreseeability of shock to the plaintiff and the shock flows from
an abnormal event, and, as such, unduly frustrates the goal of compensation-
the very purpose which the cause of action was meant to further."°
Similarly, the meaningful observation test is not useful as a tool for determining
whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated the injury to the plaintiff.
For example, an intoxicated driver should reasonably foresee that he could strike
a pedestrian while driving. He may also foresee that this pedestrian would be
accompanied by a loving family member who would suffer emotional injuries as a
100. Id. at 266, 968 P.2d at 777 (quoting Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1051 (R.I. 1994)).
101. See id. at 270, 968 P.2d at 781.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. As noted above, the Fernandez court quoted a Rhode Island case that found the need to deny
compensation in some cases "no matter how foreseeable we may agree that such anguish would be." See id. at 270,
968 P.2d. at 781 (quoting Marchetti, 638 A.2d at 1051).
106. The Fernandez defendants conceded that they provided the wrong medication, and parties settled the
wrongful death claim. See Appellant's Reply Brief at i, Fernandez (No. 24195).
107. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1985).
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result of witnessing the accident. Thus, the bystander is a foreseeable plaintiff,
regardless of whether the bystander understands the causal connection between the
accident and the victim's injuries. In this case, whether Plaintiff understood that the
pharmacy caused her granddaughter's suffering is irrelevant to the question of
whether the pharmacy could have foreseen that Mrs. Fernandez would have suffered
emotional injuries if they failed to provide the correct prescription.
Further, it is not clear that foreseeability was ever a determining factor in the
guidelines for NIED. The Dillon court derived its three guidelines as a means to
determine whether the defendant should have foreseen the plaintiff's injuries." 8
Subsequent case law, however, has undermined this part of the Dillon court's
premise. Judges and commentators have condemned each of these guidelines, when
imposed as a bright-line test, as arbitrary restraints that deny recovery despite the
foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff."°
Most jurisdictions, for example, allow spouses to recover for NIED, but not
fianc6es. "0 This has indeed led to arbitrary results, where the timing of the wedding
alone determines whether or not the plaintiff recovers. 1' Similarly, some courts and
commentators have questioned whether the emotional injury resulting from the
observation of an accident is any more foreseeable than an emotional injury that
might result from the long-term results of that accident." 2
Dillon-based elements do not provide a means to determine whether an injury
was foreseeable or not because they focus exclusively on characteristics of the
plaintiff."I The original inquiry, in Dillon, was whether the defendant could have
108. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Cal. 1968) (explaining, in regard to the requirement that the
plaintiff be present at the scene of the accident, that "[tihe defendant is more likely to foresee that shock to the
nearby, witnessing mother will cause physical harm than to anticipate that someone distant from the accident will
suffer more than a temporary emotional reaction"). As noted above, the Dillon court required the plaintiff to suffer
physical manifestations of emotional distress in order to recover distress damages. See id. at 920. Addressing the
contemporaneous sensory perception requirement, the Dillon court asserted that emotional injury was more
foreseeable when the plaintiff actually observed the accident rather than learning of the accident after the fact. See
id. at 921. Similarly, the court asserted that "a defendant is more likely to foresee that a mother who observes an
accident affecting her child will suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger witness will do so." Id; see also Ramsey
v. Beavers, 931 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tenn. 1996) ("[O]bviously, it is more foreseeable that one witnessing or having
sensory observation of the event will suffer effects from it.").
109. See, e.g., John L Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating
Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HAsrINGS LJ. 477,487-89 (1984); Kestin, supra note 41, at
535-38; Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emergingfrom
Chaos, 33 HAsTINGS L.J. 583, 589-601 (1981).
110. See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582,582-83 (Cal. 1988) (denying recovery even though plaintiff had
lived with decedent for several years in stable relationship and was "de facto spouse"). But see Dunphy v. Murphy,
642 A.2d 372, 373 (N.J. 1994) (allowing recovery for NIED for a plaintiff who had lived with accident victim for
more than two years, was engaged to victim and had set a wedding date).
111. Rejecting a strict blood relationship requirement, the Florida Supreme Court noted that a plaintiff who
is affianced with the victim could very well be described as a close relation. See Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17,
20 (Fla. 1985), recededfrom by Zell v. Meek, 665 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1995).
112. See Diamond, supra note 109, at 487.
113. See, e.g., Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that
"foreseeability depends upon what the emotionally traumatized plaintiff observes"). The Mobaldi court's argument
is based on the assumption that it is always foreseeable that a close relative will be in close proximity to the
accident scene. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 525 (N.J. 1980) ("IThe possibility that a parent may be
near her young child is always substantial.").
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foreseen the injury to the plaintiff."4 This approach is consistent with the notion of
foreseeability as put forward by Judge Cardozo, who articulated the principle that
the risk of injury to the plaintiff must be "apparent to the eye of ordinary
vigilance."' " 5 Factors that examine the plaintiff' s location, relationship to the victim,
and perception of the injury or event are only marginally effective in determining
whether the defendant could have foreseen the injury to the bystander."6 As
Professor John Diamond noted:
The Dillon guidelines, which have been applied by California courts as
limitations on duty, do not rely solely on the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant, as do many traditional barriers to tort recovery. Rather, they
are based on the fortuities of the circumstances in which the plaintiff suffered
the injury." 7
Even if the Dillon-based factors did function to distinguish between foreseeable
and unforeseeable injuries, they would not provide sufficient limitations on
recovery for emotional distress damages. As the Gabaldon court noted, the Dillon
court was overly optimistic in predicting that a foreseeability-based approach to
NIED would not lead to a flood of litigation."' Foreseeability alone does not
provide sufficient limits on recovery for emotional injuries because the
foreseeability test operates differently when applied to emotional injuries than to
physical injuries. When a negligent driver causes an accident, the zone of
foreseeable physical damage is relatively limited. With emotional damages, the
range of foreseeability is broader and extends beyond the immediate limits of time
and place. In Dillon and Ramirez, the courts' recognition of the plaintiffs' emotional
injuries did not expand liability beyond the range of foreseeable physical injuries.
As noted above, it may be equally foreseeable that emotional damage will extend
beyond a bystander on the scene to a relative who arrives shortly thereafter or a
relative who is at home, but must cope with the accident's after effects. It would be
a rare case in which the victim of a negligently inflicted injury did not have a
relative or friend who suffered some negative emotional effect as a result. In the
context of emotional injuries, foreseeability does not provide a sufficient limitation
on the range of injuries for which a negligent actor should be held liable.
With Fernandez, the New Mexico Supreme Court has effectively abandoned the
search for elements that determine whether or not a plaintiffs injury was
foreseeable. Instead, the court has consciously derived tests that will eliminate
liability for some foreseeable injuries, and will limit NIED recovery to a specific
114. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,921 (Cal. 1968) ( "[C]ourts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the
circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen").
115. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
116. See Diamond, supra note 109, at 487-90. In Diamond's view, emotional injuries to relatives are
foreseeable regardless of whether the relative was present and witnessed the infliction of injury. See id. Diamond,
therefore, would not draw a distinction between NIED and loss of consortium, as New Mexico and most states
have. See Fernandez, 126 N.M. 271-73, 968 P.2d at 782-84 (1998); Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M. 422, 426, 872
P.2d 840,844 (1994); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 384 (Tex. 1998) (differentiating
bystander cause of action from loss of consortium); cf. Jones v. Sanger, 512 S.E.2d 590, 595 (W. Va. 1998)
(holding that mental anguish damages in wrongful death action are not duplicative of action for NIED).
117. Diamond, supra note 109, at 487.
118. See Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi Property Management Inc., 122 N.M. 393, 395,925 P.2d 510,512 (1996).
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type of emotional injury that the court has determined should be compensated. The
question remains, however, as to whether the limits articulated in Fernandez
provide a principled basis by which to determine whether a plaintiff is deserving of
compensation for an emotional injury caused by a negligent defendant.
B. The Fernandez Test Does Not Serve to identify Particularly Severe
Emotional Injuries.
Just as the court did not argue that the distinction it drew in determining which
emotional injuries would be foreseeable, the court never asserted that this
distinction was based on a value judgment about the severity of the emotional
trauma in both contexts. In comparison, some courts that have adopted tests similar
to those in Fernandez have argued that some emotional injuries are more severe
than others, and therefore more deserving of judicial protection.
In Mazzagatti v. Everingham, "9 for example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
theorized that plaintiffs who observe sudden events have no time to prepare
themselves for what they are about to see, and therefore suffer deeper emotional
injuries.12 The court explained:
[w]e believe that where the close relative is not present at the scene of the
accident, but instead learns of the accident from a third party, the close relative's
prior knowledge of the injury to the victim serves as a buffer against the full
impact of observing the accident scene. By contrast, the relative who
contemporaneously observes the tortious conduct has no time span in which to
brace his or her emotional system.'
Other courts have explained that everyone can expect to suffer pain at the death
or illness of a loved one, whereas bystanders to sudden accidents suffer
"particularly exquisite anguish ... when they personally observe trauma strike a
loved one like a bolt from the blue."'" As one New Jersey court explained:
[d]iscovering the death or serious injury of an intimate family member will
always be expected to threaten one's emotional welfare. Ordinarily, however,
only a witness at the scene of the accident causing death or serious injury will
suffer a traumatic sense of loss that may destroy his sense of security and cause
severe emotional distress."
119. 516 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1986).
120. See id. at 679.
121. Id. Although the court in Mazzagatti was addressing the observation requirement, it relied on the same
rationale when imposing the sudden occurrence test in Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insulation, 471 A.2d 493 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984). Pennsylvania's highest court questioned the validity of this argument just five years after
Mazzagatti was decided, viewing the emotional interests at stake for those who witness a sudden event and those
who witness injuries that develop or occur over a longer period of time as different. See Bloom v. Dubois Reg'l
Med. Ctr., 597 A.2d 671, 682 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("[Olne might well question whether there is a sufficient
'buffer' inherent in hearing from a third party that a terrible injury has been inflicted on a loved one and in seeing
the horrible results of an accident but not the accident itself to justify denial of recovery for emotional
distress .... ").
122. Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1155 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying New Jersey law).
123. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521,527 (N.J. 1980).
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These arguments do not explain the Fernandez result, where there was no
evidence that Plaintiff had a chance to "brace herself for the emotional blow she
would sustain." Nor is there any basis to say that Plaintiff's suffering was less
significant than that suffered by the plaintiffs in Ramirez, Folz, or Acosta, or that
Plaintiff's tragedy was within the realm of experience we can all expect to endure.
The lower court in Fernandez, though it felt bound to dismiss the case, also
described the result as unjust. "[O]nly the heartless would deny [Plaintiffs] claim
to have suffered severe shock and distress from witnessing her twenty-two month
old granddaughter suffocate, go limp and die almost literally in her arms."' 25 In an
affidavit filed with her Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff stated that "nothing in my seventy-five years has been more terrifying and
painful than watching and holding Margarita while she suffered, suffocated and
died."' 26 The Fernandez court recognized that Mrs. Fernandez's experience was
"horrific and tragic."127
Nor is there a convincing argument that those plaintiffs who meet the meaningful
observation requirement will suffer more severe injuries than those who do not. The
Fernandez court did not argue that a plaintiff who watches a loved one suffer
experiences more grief when she knows that someone else has caused that pain. As
one California court explained, "[it is observation of the consequences of the
negligent act and not observation of the act itself that is likely to cause [severe]
trauma .... "v128
The Fernandez court's distinction between emotional distress arising from
observation of an actual injury-producing event and trauma resulting from merely
observing the resulting injury may be based primarily in the history of the tort.
Ramirez v. Armstrong recognized the right of bystanders to recover for emotional
injuries. 29 A subsequent case emphasized that this tort should not compensate "the
grief and despair to loved ones that invariably attend nearly every accidental death
or serious injury."'' Thus, the Fernandez court limited the NIED tort to the facts
of the earlier cases, emphasizing that "[t]his case does not present a fact pattern
which NIED was designed to remedy" without providing a reason why this plaintiff
was less deserving of compensation than those who were successful in prior cases.
124. Although the Fernandez court cited language from Gabaldon describing the "shock of seeing efforts
to save the life of an injured spouse in an ambulance or hospital" as an "experience that all may expect to endure,"
see Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 266, 968 P.2d at 777 (quoting Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi Property Management, 122 N.M.
393, 397, 925 P.2d 510, 514 (1996)), it never claimed that the same argument applied to Plaintiff's experience.
Other courts and commentators have expressly rejected the argument that bystanders to sudden accidents
suffer more serious emotional injuries than those who witness the more gradual suffering of a loved one. See, e.g.,
Mobaldi v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of California, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 727 (Ct. App. 1976) (holding that "[it
is observation of the consequences of the negligent act and not observation of the act itself that is likely to cause
[severe] trauma.. ."). See also Diamond, supra note 109, at 489 (recognizing "there is no persuasive evidence that
contemporaneous sensory perception of the actual accident is a prerequisite of severe mental harm, or that such
perception merits compensation while witnessing the destructive results does nof').
125. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 8-9, Fernandez (No. 24195) (quoting the Record at 116).
126. Id. at 8 (quoting the Record at 66).
127. See Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 268, 968 P.2d at 779.
128. Mobaldi, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
129. See 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
130. See Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi Property Management, Inc., 122 N.M. 393, 396, 925 P.2d 510, 513 (1996).
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The need to limit NIED to its historical context, however, was rooted in concern
about future expansion. The Fernandez court was particularly concerned with the
broadening of this tort, noting, for example, that "[i]f observation of the injury or
death were sufficient to show contemporaneous sensory perception, recovery for
NIED could occur in virtually all medical malpractice cases."'' Although Plaintiff
presented a compelling case for expansion of NIED beyond the specific fact
patterns recognized in earlier case law, the court's overriding concern seemed to be
that a broader range of plaintiffs would be allowed recovery in the future if the
elements of NIED were construed broadly enough to allow Plaintiff to recover.
C. Any Limitation on NIED Will Be Criticized as Arbitrary
With no basis in foreseeability or on severity, the distinction made by the
Fernandez court could easily be dismissed as arbitrary. But even the most liberal
guidelines could be subject to this criticism. Whenever the law draws a line, cases
falling close to the line will make any rule seem arbitrary, and dissenters will be
able to find examples of a sympathetic plaintiff who fell outside the bounds set by
the law. The complaint that such results are arbitrary has been the main impetus of
prior expansions of the NIED tort.
For example, there has been a gradual expansion of the contemporaneous sensory
perception element. Many courts, unlike New Mexico, continue to deny recovery
to plaintiffs who arrive at the scene of an accident shortly after the accident
occurred.' Those courts have pointed to the Dillon distinction between
contemporaneous sensory perception and learning of an accident from another
source. In Gabaldon, New Mexico denounced this distinction as arbitrary. "A
family member may come upon the scene of an accident so soon after the accident
that the victim's condition is virtually the same as at the time of impact. We cannot
say that the effect on the family member is distinguishable in any meaningful
way.' 33
The Gabaldon rule, however, is itself arbitrary, allowing recovery for relatives
who arrive before an ambulance is on scene, but not after, without explanation as
to why that harm can be meaningfully distinguished."M In contrast, other courts have
derived broader rules. In Gates v. Richardson,35 the Wyoming Supreme Court
determined that a plaintiff should be allowed to recover for NIED so long as there
has been no material change in the victims' condition or location." Even the
Wyoming court, however, has acknowledged the possibility for arbitrary results.
131. Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 267, 968 P.2d at 778.
132. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989) (denying recovery to plaintiff who was not
present at the scene of the accident but who arrived shortly after and saw her son lying in the roadway, bloody and
unconscious); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Keith, 970 S.W.2d 540,542 (Tex. 1998) (denying recovery to a mother
who arrived at the scene of an automobile accident while her daughter was still trapped inside her vehicle,
screaming for help).
133. Gabaldon, 122 N.M. at 397,925 P.2d at 513.
134. See id at 397,925 P.2d at 514. In addition, the Fernandez court's decision to maintain the Gabaldon
rule contradicts its assertion that a bystander "must observe more than the victim's injury or death." Fernandez,
126 N.M. at 268, 968 P.2d at 779. A relative who arrives after an accident will only observe the injuries to the
victim.
135. 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986).
136. See id. at199.
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"Once the victim's condition or location has materially changed, ... the moment
of crisis for which recovery is allowed is deemed to have passed .... Shock or
emotional distress may occur after this point, but it is no longer compensable."' 37
The Fernandez decision acknowledges that there is no way to escape these
arbitrary results, and no way to limit recovery if the court repeatedly expands
recovery in an attempt to do so.' No jurisdiction has derived an NIED test that
avoids arbitrary exclusion of some plaintiffs. Nor has any jurisdiction derived a
means to distinguish cases, at the prima facie stage, on the basis of either
foreseeability or severity. Thus, the courts are faced with two choices. They can
allow all cases to proceed to trial, or they can impose limits, though arbitrary, on
emotional distress recovery in an attempt to provide certainty for judges and
litigants and to limit the liability imposed on negligent defendants.
As the Fernandez court recognized, some limits are necessary to limit liability
and maintain certainty in the law. The law in the past several decades has expanded
the extent to which a negligent actor can be held responsible for the indirect effects
of his negligence. The negligent driver is held responsible for any physical injuries
or property damage he causes. He is also held responsible for the pain and suffering
associated with those physical injuries. Twenty years ago, that would be the extent
of his damages. Today, New Mexico recognizes both loss of consortium and
NIED. 39 Thus, the number of claims arising out of a single accident has increased,
creating further pressure on the courts. Similarly, the amount of damages the
negligent actor has to pay has increased, thereby raising the potential that the
defendant will be required to pay damages out of proportion to his culpability.
As the Fernandez court recognized, without limits on recovery, the tort of NIED
would expand to include the grief of every plaintiff who experiences grief at the
loss of a relative. There would then be no viable distinction between NIED and loss
of consortium, which is traditionally available only to spouses. If further expansion
is allowed for both of these torts, multiple recovery will accompany nearly every
negligent act. "Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the
waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of
wrongs to a controllable degree."'"
137. Contreras v. Carbon County Sch. Dist., 843 P.2d 589, 593 (Wyo. 1992). The Contreras court
acknowledged that other courts, most notably Massachusetts, had adopted even more liberal rules. See id. (citing
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978), which allowed NIED recovery even though plaintiff did
not see the injured victim until after arrival at a hospital). The Contreras court argued, however, that "[tihe shock
received on seeing an injured loved one in a hospital setting... is of a different quality than coming upon him or
her at the scene of an accident." Contreras, 843 P.2d at 594.
138. See generally Fernandez, 126 N.M at 270,968 P.2d at 781 (discussing public policy considerations).
139. New Mexico recognized loss of consortium in Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840 (1994).
Fernandez expanded that tort to include the grandparent-grandchild relationship. See Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 271-
273, 968 P.2d at 782-84.
140. Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419,424 (N.Y. 1969).
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VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. Fernandez Precludes Further Expansion of NIED
Under the Fernandez holding, a plaintiff will have to prove, at the prima facie
stage, that he or she has met all the elements of the NIED tort, including the two-
part test to satisfy the contemporaneous sensory perception element. Both
Fernandez and Gabaldon represented a reversal of the trend toward expansion of
this tort.1"' Given the stringent attitude adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Fernandez, it is unlikely that the court will be receptive to plaintiffs seeking
future expansion. This is significant because other jurisdictions have seen a
broadening of NIED recovery. For example, in R.D. v. W.M. 2 the Wyoming
Supreme Court allowed family members of a woman who committed suicide to
bring an NIED claim against the woman's stepfather, who had allegedly contributed
to her poor mental state and facilitated the act of suicide. While it may be possible
to categorize the successful act of suicide itself as a sudden, traumatic event, that
act was far removed from the alleged injury producing event-either the abuse or
the negligent dissemination of drugs. Thus, it is likely that New Mexico would
dismiss such a case without reaching the more complicated issue of whether NIED
applies when the victim is the actor that initiates the injury-producing event. 3
Nor would New Mexico have been likely to grant recovery in a case like Croft
v. Wicker,'" in which the Alaska Supreme Court eliminated the contemporaneous
perception requirement and allowed parents to pursue a NEED claim against the man
who sexually assaulted their fourteen-year-old daughter." 5 The Alaska court
determined that the parents stated a claim for NIED because they witnessed the
girl's emotional distress immediately after the incident. First, New Mexico would
likely dismiss this case for failure to meet the contemporaneous sensory perception
test.' 6 In addition, in each case in which New Mexico has granted recovery the
victim has suffered traumatic physical injuries that resulted in death or required
immediate emergency medical attention. The New Mexico courts have never
granted recovery when the main injury to the victim was emotional. Were the court
to grant recovery in a case like this, there would be no logical way to distinguish
these parents from the relatives of every other victim of a violent crime.
Fernandez sends a clear message that the court will not entertain the type of
expansion allowed in Wyoming and Alaska, and provides the state's trial courts
141. See supra part 111.
142. 875 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1994).
143. Other jurisdictions have also addressed claims from the relatives of suicides. In Leo v. Hillman, 665
A.2d 572, 577 (Vt. 1995), the Vermont Supreme Court relied on the zone of danger test to reject NIED claims
brought against a psychiatrist by the family members of a suicide victim. In Vasilik v. Federbush, 742 A.2d 591
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), a New Jersey court rejected a father's NIED claim based on a clinic's failure to
hospitalize his son, who committed suicide fifteen hours later. The court ruled that the father, who had not
accompanied his son to the clinic, did not immediately connect the clinic's negligence with his son's suicide. See
id. at 594.
144. 737 P.2d 789 (Alaska 1987).
145. See id. at 792.
146. Conceivably, the plaintiffs could argue that they were present immediately after the incident and saw
its effects, and therefore met the requirements as set forth in Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi Property Management, Inc., 122
N.M. 393, 397, 925 P.2d 510, 514 (1996).
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with an efficient means to dispose of such cases. As discussed in the Analysis
section, some New Mexico plaintiffs will have an alternative avenue for recovery
in loss of consortium, just as Plaintiff did in this case.
B. New Mexico Will Need to Clarify the Availability of Emotional Distress
Damages in Contract Actions
Some plaintiffs who do not meet the Fernandez standards may be able to recover
emotional distress damages under the breach of contract theory developed in Flores
v. Baca.'47 After Fernandez, however, it is not clear how broadly the court will
apply Flores. In that case, the court held that a plaintiff could recover emotional
distress damages in a breach of contract action when the breaching party assumed
an obligation to use reasonable skill and care to avoid severe mental distress to the
other party. 14 Because it was a breach of contract action, the limitations imposed
on bystanders did not apply. Thus, even those family members who did not
personally see the decomposed body were allowed to recover for emotional distress
damages in that case. 49 The New Mexico Supreme Court reaffirmed the Flores
holding in Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne Mortuary,"S less than a year before Fernandez
was decided.
Conceivably, Fernandez could have been brought as a breach of contract case,
on the theory that the drug store breached its sales contract by providing the wrong
prescription.' Plaintiff, however, did not bring a claim for breach of contract, and
thus the tort claim was the only one before the court. As a result, the court did not
discuss the implication of the Fernandez decision for breach of contract cases. In
future cases, however, the court may decide that Fernandez is the controlling
precedent for most cases involving emotional injuries to third parties, and perhaps
limit Flores and Jaynes to the funeral service context.
147. 117 N.M. 306,871 P.2d962 (1994).
148. See id at 310,871 P.2d at 966. In Flores, the body of a man was exhumed two weeks after his burial.
It was discovered that the funeral director had done an incomplete and inadequate job embalming the body. As a
result, the body was severely decayed when it was exhumed. The court awarded emotional distress damages to the
widow and her thirteen children, holding that the funeral director had undertaken a contractual duty to prevent the
sort of emotional trauma the family members suffered. See id. at 309, 314, 871 P.2d at 965, 970.
149. See id. at 309, 871 P.2d at 965.
150. 124 N.M. 613,954 P.2d 45(1997). in Jaynes, a mortuary service disturbed a grave within a family plot
while preparing another grave. The Jaynes court affirmed Flores, but denied the plaintiffs' claims because they
had not alleged sufficiently serious emotional distress. See id. While both of these cases involved burials, the
Jaynes court declined to articulate a rule specific to funeral directors, instead preserving the application of Flores
to those breach of contract actions in which emotional distress is within the contemplation of the parties. See id
(discussing Flores, 117 N.M. at 312, 871 P.2d at 968).
151. Because Plaintiff purchased the drugs, she would be a principal party to the contract, and her grand-
daughter a third-party beneficiary. Though it does not present as strong a case as Flores, the plaintiff could have
argued that the contractual sale was designed to avoid mental anguish. The store was providing drugs for a sick
child. Plaintiffs sole purpose in purchasing the drugs was to make her granddaughter well. It could be argued, then,
that one of the aims of this contract was to secure the emotional well-being of the child and her family members.
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C. Fernandez Will Guide New Mexico's Treatment of NIED in the
Malpractice Context
Although Fernandez involved the allegedly negligent dispensation of drugs, it
was not a medical malpractice case.1 52 New Mexico has not yet determined whether
or to what extent a bystander to an injury caused by medical malpractice can bring
a claim for NIED. The Fernandez court, however, indicated that the tort could be
available to the relatives of malpractice victims in the rare cases in which they met
the newly devised standards for contemporaneous sensory perception, along with
the other elements of NIED. Thus, the malpractice would have to result in a sudden,
traumatic event, rather than a slowly progressing illness, 53 and the plaintiff would
have to understand at the time that this sudden event is causing injury to the patient.
Cases that could meet the Fernandez test have arisen in otherjurisdictions. In the
malpractice context, bystander claims often arise when parents bring in children for
treatment,' or malpractice occurs during the delivery of a child. 55 While a
misdiagnosis "normally does not create the kind of horrifying scene that is a
prerequisite for recovery,"' 56 in some cases malpractice does cause a sudden,
traumatic event. In Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of the University of California,157
for example, a boy suffered immediate convulsions and then fell into a coma after
a nurse mistakenly injected him with a dangerous level of glucose.5 ' His mother,
who was holding the boy at the time, successfully brought a claim for NIED. 5 9
Bystanders to malpractice, however, may have a more difficult time meeting the
meaningful observation requirement. In Mobaldi, for example, the injury-producing
event was the nurse's injection of glucose. Under New Mexico's standards, that
plaintiff could only recover if she understood that the injection caused the boy's
152. Independent pharmacies are not included in the definition ofhealth care providers within New Mexico's
malpractice statute. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-3(A) (1996) ("health care provider means a person, corporation,
organization, facility, or institution licensed or certified by this state to provide health care or professional services
as a doctor of medicine, hospital, outpatient health care facility, doctor of osteopathy, chiropractor, podiatrist, nurse
anesthetist or physician's assistant."). In her Reply Brief, Plaintiff objected to the trial court's reliance on medical
malpractice case law from other jurisdictions in denying her NIED claim, arguing that she was not "seeking to
recover for medical malpractice or NIED arising out of medical malpractice." See Appellant's Reply Brief at 10,
Fernandez (No. 24,915).
153. The court explicitly stated that NIED would not be available to the relatives who witnessed the gradual
deterioration of a loved one due to a medical condition or who suffered from progressive, internal medical
conditions, as Margarita did. See Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 269-270, 968 P.2d at 780-81.
154. See, e.g., Mobaldi v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of California, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 726 (Ct. App. 1976)
(allowing recovery for a mother who was holding child when he reacted to an injection with a dangerously high
level of glucose).
155. See, e.g., Gendek v. Poblete, 654 A.2d 970,974 (N.J. 1995) (denying father recovery for NIED because
he was not present to observe the act of malpractice during the birth). NIED claims often arise in jurisdictions that
deny wrongful death recovery for stillborn infants. See, e.g., Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142,1143-45 (N.Y.
1985) (denying claim that mother of stillborn was within the zone of danger and affirming New York rule denying
wrongful death damages). See also Edinburg Hosp. Auth. v. Trevino, 941 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1997) (affirming
that there is no survival cause of action for the loss of a fetus, and holding that a bystander to medical malpractice
cannot recover for NIED).
156. Frame v. Kothari, 560 A.2d 675,680 (N.J. 1989).
157. 127 Cal.Rptr. 720 (Ct. App. 1976).
158. Seeid. at723.
159. See id. at 722-723.
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sudden reaction. Thus, the Fernandez factors will limit the possibility that a
bystander to medical malpractice will be able to recover for NIED.' °
Future defendants may ask the New Mexico courts to go even further and follow
jurisdictions that have denied all NIED recovery in the medical malpractice
context.'6 ' Courts that have adopted this approach have raised public policy
concerns about the need to limit malpractice liability and the potential that hospitals
will seek to limit liability by refusing to allow relatives to accompany patients
during treatment. 6 2 In addition, the Texas Supreme Court raised the following
concern:
The very nature of medical treatment is often traumatic to the layperson. Even
when a medical procedure proves to be beneficial to the patient, it may shock
the senses of the ordinary bystander who witnesses it. A bystander may not be
able to distinguish between medical treatment that helps the patient and conduct
that is harmful. A physician's primary duty is to the patient, not the patient's
relatives.' 63
The language in Fernandez, however, seemed to indicate that New Mexico
would not impose a different rule for NIED cases arising out of malpractice.'
VII. CONCLUSION
In Dillon v. Legg, the California Supreme Court granted bystanders to accidents
the right to recover for emotional distress damages, and proposed that courts should
apply the same standards for foreseeable emotional injuries that govern recovery for
foreseeable physical injuries. Although New Mexico's courts adopted a more
160. Many jurisdictions impose a more stringent rule for malpractice cases than other cases, requiring an
NIED plaintiff to witness the actual act of malpractice which can be immediately connected with the injuries to
the victim. See, e.g., Tiburzio v. Kelly, 681 A.2d 757,772-73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Gendek v. Poblete, 654 A.2d
970,974 (N.J. 1995); Pate v. Children's Hosp. of Mich., 404 N.W.2d 632,633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Smelko v.
Brinton, 740 P.2d 591, 598 (Kan. 1987); Nutter v. Frisbie Mem'l Hosp., 474 A.2d 584, 587 (N.H. 1984). In
operation, this will produce the same results as New Mexico's requirement that the plaintiff witness an injury-
producing event, because, in general, malpractice is unlikely to precipitate a separate injury-producing event. But
see Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 515, 775 P.2d 713, 717 (1989) (physician owed duty of care to third-
party injured in accident by patient who drove after receiving injection of narcotics).
161. See Edinburg Hosp. Auth. v. Trevino, 941 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1997) (holding that a bystander to
medical malpractice cannot recover mental anguish damages). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that
because medical malpractice is governed exclusively by statute, it was up to the legislature to expand recovery to
bystanders. See Ziulkowski v. Nierengarten, 565 N.W.2d 164, 167 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). Some courts have held
that medical practitioners owed no duty of care to the relatives of patients, only to the patients themselves. See, e.g.,
Gray v. INOVA Health Care Services, 514 S.E.2d 355, 356 (Va. 1999) (hospital owed no duty to mother when
performing tests on daughter); O'Hara v. Holy Cross Hosp., 561 N.E.2d 18, 20-22 (ill. 1990) (emergency room
does not have a duty to protect a nonpatient bystander from fainting by virtue of the fact that the nonpatient is
allowed to enter the emergency room and remain with the patient during treatment; hospital's initiative in inviting
mother to observe son's preoperative care did not create special relationship and thereby impose duty of care). In
jurisdictions that apply the zone of danger or physical impact rules there is little potential for extension into the
medical malpractice context. Such claims have arisen, however, in cases involving stillbirths. See, e.g., Tebbutt
v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142,1143 (N.Y. 1985); Parsons v. Chenango Mem'l Hosp., 620 N.Y.S.2d 604,605 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994) (holding that mother who endured prolonged labor did not demonstrate independent physical
injury or presence in 'zone of danger,' and therefore could not recover for emotional distress from death of child
after birth).
162. See Edinburg, 941 S.W.2d at 80.
163. ld. at 81.
164. See Fernandez, 126 N.M. at 267-68, 968 P.2d at 778-79.
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restrictive approach than California when first recognizing NIED in Ramirez v.
Armstrong, the Ramirez court also sought to compensate foreseeable emotional
injuries. The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Fernandez represents a
recognition that foreseeability does not provide a sufficient limitation on the range
of emotional injuries for which a negligent actor should be held liable. The
Fernandez court further recognized that courts must set firm limitations on the right
to recover for indirect emotional injuries, even though the application of such
limitations will sometimes lead to arbitrary results. In Fernandez, the court chose
to limit NIED recovery to those emotional injuries that arise from observation of
injury-producing events, rather than those that arise from observing the suffering
of a loved one. Thus, it held that plaintiffs must establish that they 1) witnessed a
sudden, traumatic, injury-producing event, and 2) were aware at the time of the
event that it was causing injury to the victim in order to meet the contemporaneous
sensory perception prong of the NIED test. Those plaintiffs who do not meet these
tests can legitimately claim that the court is denying recovery to foreseeable, severe
injuries. Such limitations are necessary, however, to provide certainty in the law and
insure that defendants are not exposed to liability out of proportion to their
culpability.
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